

Message Text

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PAGE 4, LINE 8, PAGE 12, LINE 16
OMITTED)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: CONG. TESTIMONY: AF CONTRIBUTION TO Q AND A'S

1. FOLLOWING ARE AF'S Q AND A'S ON SOUTHERN AFRICA AND
ETHIOPIA.

2. SOUTHERN AFRICA

PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES:

Q. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE DECOLONIZATION OF PORTUGAL'S
AFRICAN TERRITORIES?

A. PORTUGAL'S AFRICAN TERRITORIES ARE IN VARIOUS STAGES
OF DECOLONIZATION. ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT YET SIGNED WRITTEN
AGREEMENTS WITH THEM ALL, PORTUGAL HAS ACCEPTED THE
PRINCIPLE OF INDEPENDENCE FOR ALL OF THEM AND IS WORKING
SINCERELY TOWARDS THAT GOAL. WE WELCOME AND ENCOURAGE THIS
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POSITION.

AS YOU MAY KNOW, THE INDEPENDENCE OF GUINEA-BISSAU WAS
RECOGNIZED ON SEPTEMBER 10 BY PORTUGAL.

MOZAMBIQUE AND THE ISLANDS OF SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE (THE LATTER OFF THE COAST OF GABON) HAVE BEEN FORMALLY SCHEDULED FOR INDEPENDENCE ON JUNE 25, 1975, AND JULY 12, 1975, RESPECTIVELY. WE UNDERSTAND THAT DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN

HELD ON THE FUTURE OF THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS AND THAT THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS TOWARD THEIR SELF-DETERMINATION.

ANGOLA POSES THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM BECAUSE OF DIVISIONS WITHIN AND AMONG ITS THREE MAJOR LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. A FORMAL AGREEMENT ON ANGOLA IS UNLIKELY UNTIL THEY ACHIEVE UNITY OF PURPOSE OR SOME ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION IS FOUND. WE UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT BOTH PORTUGAL AND INTERESTED NATIONS (E.G. ZAIRE, ZAMBIA) ARE WORKING DILIGENTLY TOWARD AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION.

Q. WHAT ABOUT THE FIGHTING THERE?

A. FIGHTING BETWEEN THE PORTUGUESE AND THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, WHICH LASTED FOR OVER A DECADE, HAS CEASED. RECENT VIOLENT INCIDENTS IN BOTH ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE STEMMED MAINLY FROM DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LOCAL GROUPS AND HAVE BEEN BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL THROUGH THE COMBINED EFFORTS OF PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES AND THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS.

Q. WHAT IS OUR ROLE IN THIS? WHAT ARE WE DOING ABOUT IT? WHAT ARE THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE DOING THERE?

A. WE HAVE PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY WELCOMED PORTUGAL'S DECISION TO DECOLONIZE ITS AFRICAN TERRITORIES AND ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE PROGRESS MADE TO DATE. WE SUPPORTED GUINEA-BISSAU'S ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS LAST AUGUST, RECOGNIZED IT ON SEPTEMBER 10, AND ARE DISCUSSING WITH IT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. WE CONGRATULATED THE NEW TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT (ONE-THIRD PORTUGUESE, TWO-THIRDS FRELIMO LIBERATION MOVEMENT) THAT
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WAS INSTALLED IN MOZAMBIQUE ON SEPTEMBER 20. WE HAVE HELD CONVERSATIONS WITH IT LOOKING TO A POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP, AND ARE STUDYING WAYS IN WHICH WE COULD RESPOND TO FEASIBLE REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE FROM ANY OF THE EMERGING PORTUGUESE-SPEAKING COUNTRIES.

BEYOND THIS, HOWEVER, AND OUR EXPRESSED DESIRE TO HAVE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS WITH THESE COUNTRIES, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE. WE HAVE THUS NOT ATTEMPTED TO INFLUENCE EITHER THE PACE OR THE MECHANICS OF DECOLONIZATION, WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE BEST LEFT TO THOSE DIRECTLY CONCERNED--THE PORTUGUESE AND AFRICANS.

THE SOVIETS AND THE CHINESE HAVE SUP-
PORTED SOME OF THE LIBERATION GROUPS IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA.
THEY UNDOUBTEDLY HOPE FOR AMICABLE RELATIONS WITH THE

EMERGING GOVERNMENTS AND WILL PROBABLY BE LOOKING AT WAYS
IN WHICH THEY CAN BE OF ASSISTANCE IN THEIR FUTURE
DEVELOPMENT. WHETHER OR NOT THEY HOPE FOR ANYTHING BEYOND
THIS KIND OF RELATIONSHIP WE DO NOT KNOW. WE WILL, OF
COURSE, CONTINUE TO KEEP CLOSE WATCH ON THEIR ACTIVITIES
IN THIS AREA.

Q. WHAT ABOUT OIL-RICH CABINDA? ARE WE DOING ANYTHING TO
PROTECT OUR ACCESS TO ITS OIL THROUGH GULF?

A. THERE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE A PRESENT THREAT TO OUR
ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN CABINDA OR ELSEWHERE IN PORTUGUESE-
SPEAKING AFRICA. IF PRECEDENT MEANS ANYTHING, AND WE
THINK IT DOES, WE SHOULD NOT ANTICIPATE SERIOUS HARM TO
OUR INVESTMENTS. THE INDEPENDENCE AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY
PORTUGAL WITH GUINEA-BISSAU AND MOZAMBIQUE INCLUDED
CLAUSES THAT ASSURED ADHERENCE BY THE SUCCESSOR GOVERN-
MENTS TO PREVIOUSLY EXISTING FINANCIAL AGREEMENTS. ALL OF
THE EMERGING NATIONS NEED FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND WILL
PROBABLY MOVE CAUTIOUSLY CONCERNING IT.

I MUST ADMIT, THOUGH, THAT CABINDA'S SITUATION IS
RATHER UNIQUE. IT IS CONSIDERED BY BOTH PORTUGAL AND THE
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ANGOLAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS TO BE VERY MUCH A PART OF
ANGOLA, EVEN THOUGH SEPARATED BY THE NECK OF ZAIRE. HOW-
EVER, A MOVEMENT HAS SURFACED IN CABINDA DEMANDING ITS
INDEPENDENCE SEPARATE FROM ANGOLA. WE CANNOT YET
ACCURATELY ASSESS THE POPULARITY OR CHANCES OF SUCCESS OF
THIS SEPARATIST SENTIMENT.

RHODESIA:

Q. WHAT IS THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA AT THIS TIME?

A. PRIME MINISTER IAN SMITH'S RHODESIAN FRONT GOVERNMENT
UNILATERALLY DECLARED RHODESIA'S INDEPENDENCE FROM GREAT
BRITAIN IN 1965. THIS ACT REMAINS UNRECOGNIZED BY ANY
COUNTRY, INCLUDING SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE SITUATION IN
SOUTHERN RHODESIA WAS DETERMINED TO BE A THREAT TO INTER-
NATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN A SERIES OF UNANIMOUS
RESOLUTIONS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL BEGINNING IN 1966.
WE CONSIDER THE RHODESIAN QUESTION TO BE AN ESSENTIALLY
BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY.

THIS SITUATION PERSISTS, ALTHOUGH IT HAS BECOME INCREAS-

INGLY PRECARIOUS IN RECENT MONTHS. THE NEW TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE HAS PERMITTED RHODESIAN TRADE TO CONTINUE TO PASS THROUGH MOZAMBIKAN PORTS, BUT PRESSURES ON IT TO ENFORCE UN-SPONSORED SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY INCREASE. THE LOW-LEVEL GUERRILLA WARFARE PRESENTLY UNDERWAY IN SOME PARTS OF THE COUNTRY CONTINUES. FURTHER, WHILE RHODESIA'S ECONOMIC AND MILITARY DEPENDENCE UPON SOUTH AFRICA SEEMS LIKELY TO INCREASE, SOUTH AFRICA HAS GIVEN SOME INDICATIONS THAT IT IS SERIOUSLY RECONSIDERING ITS SUPPORT OF RHODESIA, WITHOUT WHICH THE SMITH REGIME CANNOT SURVIVE. HENCE, PRESSURES TOWARD A SETTLEMENT ARE CLEARLY GROWING. WE HOPE THAT THE PARTICIPANTS WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THESE PRESSURES.

Q. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTS PASSAGE OF THE BILL REPEALING THE BYRD AMENDMENT (RHODESIAN CHROME) BEFORE THE END OF THIS SESSION. WHAT IS THE BASIS OF THIS SUPPORT?

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A. I HAVE LONG BELIEVED THAT THIS MEASURE IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, HAS NO LONG-RUN ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES FOR US, AND IS A DISTINCT LIABILITY TO US IN OUR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA WERE DESIGNED TO BRING PRESSURE UPON THE ILLEGAL SMITH REGIME TO ARRIVE AT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WITH RHODESIA'S AFRICAN MAJORITY. NOW MORE THAN AT ANY PREVIOUS TIME IN RECENT YEARS, PRESSURES ARE MOUNTING UPON THAT REGIME. IN ADDITION TO BRINGING US INTO COMPLIANCE WITH UN SANCTIONS, REPEAL OF THE BYRD AMENDMENT WOULD PROVIDE CONSIDERABLE STIMULUS TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

Q. IF WE CUT OURSELVES OFF FROM RHODESIAN CHROME, WILL WE NOT THEN BE FORCED TO BUY CHROME FROM THE SOVIET UNION, POSSIBLY AT INFLATED PRICES?

A. THE U. S. BOUGHT CHROMITE ORE AND FERROCHROME FROM SOME SEVENTEEN COUNTRIES IN 1973. AN ADDITIONAL TWELVE NATIONS EXPORTED CHROMITE AND A FURTHER FIVE EXPORTED FERROCHROME TO NATIONS OTHER THAN THE U. S. IN THE OVERALL WORLD MARKET FOR THESE MINERALS. RHODESIA IS OUR FIFTH LARGEST SUPPLIER OF THESE MINERALS, AFTER SOUTH AFRICA, THE PHILIPPINES, THE U.S.S.R., AND TURKEY, PROVIDING LESS THAN 6 PER CENT OF OUR IMPORTS OF THESE MINERALS FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1974. THE CHROMITE AND FERROCHROME WE NOW BUY FROM RHODESIA CAN BE READILY REPLACED

FROM OTHER SOURCES, OTHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING DOMESTIC FERROCHROME PRODUCTION.

SOUTH AFRICA:

Q. HAS ANYTHING HAPPENED TO SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICIES FOLLOWING OUR VETO OF ITS EXPULSION FROM THE UN?

A. INTERNALLY, WE HAVE SO FAR SEEN NOTHING TO INDICATE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IS CHANGING ITS POLICY OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT FOR NON-WHITES. DURING THE EXPULSION DEBATE, THE SOUTH AFRICAN UN REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD DO EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO
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MOVE AWAY FROM RACIAL DISCRIMINATION. WE WELCOMED THAT STATEMENT AND CONTINUE TO HOPE THAT PRETORIA WILL TAKE MEANINGFUL STEPS TO TRANSLATE THESE WORDS INTO REALITY.

EXTERNALLY, THERE HAS BEEN SOME MOVEMENT (SEE UNDER NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA).

Q. ARE WE DOING ANYTHING TO MAKE SOUTH AFRICA LIVE UP TO ITS PROMISES?

A. WE HAVE URGED SOUTH AFRICA TO BRING TO AN END ITS APARTHEID POLICIES AND TO ESTABLISH THE BASIS FOR A JUST SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT WHERE ALL ARE EQUAL. WE ARE CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE POSITIVE CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA. AN EXAMPLE IS OUR PROGRAM TO ENCOURAGE AMERICAN FIRMS IN SOUTH AFRICA TO ADOPT IMPROVED EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES FOR THEIR NON-WHITE EMPLOYEES.

WE HAVE CALLED ON SOUTH AFRICA TO MAKE GOOD THE ASSURANCES IT GAVE TO UN SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM IN APRIL OF LAST YEAR TO ALLOW THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA TO DETERMINE THE FUTURE OF THE TERRITORY BY EXERCISING THEIR RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND TO WITHDRAW FROM NAMIBIA.

FINALLY, WITH REGARD TO SOUTHERN RHODESIA, WE HAVE CALLED ON SOUTH AFRICA TO FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, THAT IS, TO COMPLY WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS RELATING TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND WITHDRAWAL OF ITS PARA-MILITARY POLE FORCES FROM RHODESIA.

NAMIBIA:

Q. IN THE WAKE OF OUR RECENT VETO OF SOUTH AFRICA'S EXPULSION FROM THE UN, WHAT HAS HAPPENED ON THE NAMIBIAN
ISSUE?

A. ON OCTOBER 30, AMBASSADOR SCALI CALLED ON SOUTH AFRICA IN A UN SECURITY COUNCIL SPEECH TO ALLOW THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

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AND TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORY.

THE CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION IS THAT THE PEOPLES OF NAMIBIA, NOT SOUTH AFRICA OR THE UN, WILL DETERMINE THE FUTURE OF NAMIBIA. ALL OPTIONS, INCLUDING UNITARY INDEPENDENCE ARE OPEN, ACCORDING TO SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICIALS. THE NON-WHITE TRIBAL GROUPS IN NAMIBIA ARE TO CHOOSE LEADERS WHO WILL MEET WITH THE LEADERS OF THE WHITE COMMUNITY TO DISCUSS THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERRITORY. SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR BOTHA, SPEAKING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON OCTOBER 24, STATED THAT THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA MIGHT EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION "CONSIDERABLY SOONER" THAN THE 10-YEAR FORECAST MADE BY SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN MINISTER IN 1973. WE WILL CONTINUE TO IMPRESS UPON SOUTH AFRICA OUR INTEREST THAT IT MATCH ITS STATEMENTS REGARDING NAMIBIA WITH SPECIFIC CONCRETE ACTIONS.

STRATEGIC INTERESTS:

Q. TO WHAT EXTENT IS OUR INTEREST IN PORTUGUESE-SPEAKING AFRICA, OR ELSEWHERE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, INFLUENCED BY STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS?

A. OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE PORTUGUESE AFRICAN TERRITORIES HAVE BEEN LIMITED IN THE PAST TO OCCASIONAL PORT CALLS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE BY U.S. NAVY VESSELS AND EMERGENCY REFUELING STOPS IN THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS. OUR INTERESTS IN THESE TERRITORIES HAVE NOT GONE BEYOND THESE OCCASIONAL USES.

WE RECOGNIZE THE POTENTIAL STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE MOZAMBIQUE CHANNEL, THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, AND THE SEAS OFF WEST AFRICA. WE DO NOT PRESENTLY PERCEIVE A THREAT TO THE LIMITED INTERESTS WE HAVE IN THESE AREAS. WE THEREFORE HAVE NO INTENTIONS OF EMBARKING ON ANY KIND OF MILITARY OR NAVAL COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA, OR OF EXPANDING OUR NAVAL PRESENCE ELSEWHERE IN THESE AREAS.

ETHIOPIA

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QUESTION: WHAT ARE THE CAUSES FOR THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ETHIOPIA?

ANSWER: THE RULING PROVISIONAL MILITARY COUNCIL (PMC), CONTROLLED BY A GROUP OF YOUNG OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN,

ANNOUNCED ON NOVEMBER 24 THAT IT HAD EXECUTED 62 CIVILIAN AND MILITARY DETAINEES AND HOSTAGES, INCLUDING TOP OFFICIALS OF THE OLD REGIME AND SUSPECTED PLOTTERS WITHIN THE PMC. AMONG THOSE KILLED WERE GENERAL AMAN, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PMC; FORMER PRIME MINISTER ENDALKACHEW MAKONNEN; ADMIRAL DESTA, THE EMPEROR'S GRANDSON; BUT NOT THE EMPEROR HIMSELF.

IT IS UNCLEAR WHO IS IN CONTROL. MAJOR MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM, THE 36-YEAR-OLD DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE PMC, MAY INHERIT AMAN'S TITLE. BUT THE INNER CORE OF THE PMC, TO WHICH MENGISTU REPORTEDLY BELONGS, REMAINS ANONYMOUS.

THE KILLINGS WERE APPARENTLY TRIGGERED BY A POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE PMC AND AMAN. WE DO NOT KNOW ALL THE REASONS FOR THAT STRUGGLE BUT THEY MAY HAVE INCLUDED ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING:

--(A) AMAN MAY HAVE MADE A BID AMONG HIS SUPPORTERS IN THE PMC - MOSTLY ENLISTED MEN AND NCO'S - TO ACHIEVE POWER COMMENSURATE WITH HIS TITLE. HE CHAFED AT TAKING ORDERS FROM YOUNGER OFFICERS AND DISAGREED WITH KEY PMC POLICIES, PARTICULARLY TOWARD HIS OWN PROVINCE OF ERITREA.

--(B) AT THE SAME TIME, THE PMC MAY HAVE FEARED THAT PRO-MONARCHIST ELEMENTS MIGHT HAVE USED AMAN TO STAGE A COMEBACK.

--(C) AS THE PMC TRIED TO STREAMLINE ITS DECISION-MAKING DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS, AMAN RESISTED A PROPOSAL TO REDUCE THE 120-MAN MEMBERSHIP TO AS FEW AS 15 OF THE BEST-EDUCATED JUNIOR OFFICERS AND TO SEND THE ENLISTED MEN AND NCO'S BACK TO THEIR UNITS. THE INCREASING SELF-CONFIDENCE OF THE YOUNGER OFFICERS IN THE PMC AND THEIR REPORTED WILLINGNESS TO SURFACE AS A JUNTA REDUCED THE NEED FOR SECRET

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AMAN, WHO SERVED AS A UNIFYING SYMBOL FOR THE MILITARY DURING THE PLANNING FOR THE EMPEROR'S DEPOSITION.

--(D) ANOTHER DISAGREEMENT DEVELOPED OVER ERITREA: AMAN WANTED A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT; THE PMC WANTED A STEPPING

UP OF MILITARY ACTION FOLLOWING THE ERITREAN SPURNING OF THE PMC'S PUBLICLY PROFFERED SOLUTION (INTERNAL SELF-GOVERNMENT AND THE GUARANTEE OF EQUAL RIGHTS FOR ALL ETHIOPIANS WITHIN A REFORMED POLITY). THE PMC WILL NOT COUNTENANCE CONTINUING DEMANDS FOR A SEPARATE STATE AND HAVE SENT REINFORCEMENTS TO DEAL WITH A DETERIORATING MILITARY SITUATION.

--(E) AMAN MAY ALSO HAVE DRAGGED HIS HEELS ON INTERNAL REFORMS. HE WAS MORE CONSERVATIVE THAN THE YOUNGER OFFICERS AND SUSPECT BECAUSE OF HIS CLOSE PERSONAL TIES WITH HAILE SELASSIE.

QUESTION: HOW DOES THE UNITED STATES REGARD THE EXECUTIONS?

ANSWER: WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE EXECUTIONS AND THE WAY IN WHICH THEY APPARENTLY WERE CARRIED OUT. WE INSTRUCTED OUR CHARGE TO COMMUNICATE OUR CONCERN TO THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT AND OUR HOPE THAT NO FURTHER EXECUTIONS TAKE PLACE. OUR CHARGE HAS ALSO, IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRESS REPORTS THAT THE MILITARY REGIME INTENDED TO EXECUTE EX-EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE, EXPRESSED TO THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT OUR BELIEF THAT SUCH AN ACTION WOULD BE VIEWED WITH SHOCK AND REVULSION IN THE US AND ELSEWHERE.

QUESTION: DOES THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZE THE NEW ETHIOPIAN REGIME?

ANSWER: WE ARE ENDEAVORING TO ASCERTAIN THE LOCAL SITUATION MORE PRECISELY. WHILE WE ARE CONTINUING WORKING-LEVEL CONTACTS, WE HAVE PUT A HOLD ON ADDITIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE OR ANY NEW ECONOMIC AID AGREEMENTS. OUR CURRENT PRACTICE IN THE CASE OF ABRUPT GOVERNMENTAL CHANGES
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IS TO DEEMPHASIZE THE ISSUE OF RECOGNITION. RATHER, THE EMBASSY IS INSTRUCTED TO CONTINUE WORKING-LEVEL CONTACTS AND MONITOR THE SITUATION CLOSELY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE NEW REGIME HAS EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRY; THE SIGNING OF NEW AGREEMENTS AND OTHER SIGNIFICANT BILATERAL ACTIONS ARE NORMALLY AVOIDED DURING THIS PERIOD. WE THEN LET FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS GUIDE US IN DETERMINING THE TYPE OF RELATIONS WE WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE WITH A NEW REGIME.

QUESTION: WHAT IS THE SECURITY SITUATION?

ANSWER: OUR EMBASSY REPORTS THAT THE SITUATION IN ADDIS

ABABA AND THE COUNTRY REMAINS CALM AND THAT AMERICAN CITIZENS APPEAR TO BE IN NO DANGER. THEY HAVE BEEN WARNED, HOWEVER, TO USE CAUTION IN THEIR MOVEMENTS.

QUESTION: WHAT IS THE STATUS OF OUR REPRESENTATION IN ETHIOPIA? IS THERE A US AMBASSADOR THERE?

ANSWER: THERE IS NO AMBASSADOR AT THE POST. THE QUESTION OF AN AMERICAN AMBASSADOR REMAINS UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERA-

TION.

QUESTION: WHAT WILL THE REACTION IN ETHIOPIA BE?

ANSWER: A POPULAR REACTION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE IS UNLIKELY. THE POPULACE IN ADDIS ABABA IS STILL STUNNED BY THE NEWS, ALTHOUGH LABOR TROUBLE MAY BE BREWING.

THE KEY QUESTION, HOWEVER, IS THE REACTION OF THE REST OF THE MILITARY TO THE KILLINGS. REPORTS OF OPPOSITION FROM UNITS IN ADDIS ABABA AND IN THE OUTLYING AREAS ARE COMING IN, BUT WE DO NOT YET HAVE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO JUDGE WHAT FORM THIS OPPOSITION MAY TAKE OR HOW SERIOUS IT MAY BE. A SERIOUS MILITARY SPLIT WOULD LEAD TO CIVIL WAR.

QUESTION: WHO IS MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM, WHO HAS BEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS AS BEING THE NEW "ETHIOPIAN STRONG SECRET

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MAN"?

ANSWER: MAJOR MENGISTU IS OFFICIALLY FIRST VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT. HE HAS BEEN PUBLICLY IDENTIFIED AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ARMED FORCES COORDINATING COMMITTEE (AFCC) - ALSO REFERRED TO AS THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY COUNCIL - A GROUP OF YOUNG OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN WHICH HAS GENERALLY BEEN IMPOSING ITS CONTROL OVER ETHIOPIA SINCE JUNE.

HE IS AN ORDANCE OFFICER. HIS PREVIOUS POSITION WAS AS OPERATIONS AND TRAINING OFFICER FOR THE 4TH DIVISION, WHICH IS HEADQUARTERED IN ADDIS ABABA. MENGISTU ATTENDED SEVERAL COURSES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1964-65 AND 1970-71, THE LATTER AT THE ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND IN MARYLAND. U

US CONTACTS WITH HIM HAVE ONLY BEEN IN HIS PROFESSIONAL MILITARY CAPACITY AND WE HAVE NO CONTACT WITH HIM SINCE HE ASSUMED A POLITICAL ROLE THIS YEAR. WE DO NOT KNOW HIS POLITICAL IDEAS.

QUESTION: WILL HE SUCCEED AMAN?

ANSWER: AS YET NO SUCCESSOR TO AMAN HAS BEEN NAMED. AT THE TIME AMAN WAS DEPOSED, BUT BEFORE HIS EXECUTION, IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT SOMEONE OUTSIDE THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY COUNCIL WOULD BE SELECTED TO BE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT.

QUESTION: WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY COUNCIL?

ANSWER: AGAIN WE KNOW LITTLE ABOUT THEM. WE BELIEVE MOST OF ITS MEMBERS ARE AT THE RANK OF MAJOR OR LOWER. THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE COUNCIL IS LARGELY ANONYMOUS AND NOT KNOWN TO OUTSIDERS.

QUESTION: ARE WE GOING TO CONTINUE SHIPPING ARMS TO ETHIOPIA?

ANSWER: WE HAVE SUSPENDED SHIPMENT OF ALL MILITARY EQUIP-
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MENT TO ETHIOPIA PENDING A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE SITUATION AND WE ARE NOT CONCLUDING ANY NEW ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS. AS IN THE CASE OF THE ISSUE OF RECOGNITION WE WILL LET FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS GUIDE US IN DETERMINING THE TYPE OF RELATIONS WE WILL HAVE WITH THE NEW REGIME.

QUESTION: HOW IS THE EMPEROR?

ANSWER: ACCORDING TO OUR LATEST NEWS HE IS IN GOOD HEALTH AND IS BEING HELD IN MENELIK PALACE, WHICH WAS HIS OLD ADMINISTRATIVE HEADQUARTERS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS DENIED A PRESS REPORT THAT HE HAD BEEN MOVED AND WOULD SHORTLY BE EXECUTED.

QUESTION: WHAT CAN WE FORESEE AS THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXECUTIONS AND THE IDEOLOGY OF THE NEW RULING MILITARY CLIQUE?
CLIQUE?

ANSWER: THE PRESENT MILITARY RULERS OF ETHIOPIA MAY HAVE HOPED BY EXECUTING 61 HOSTAGES ON SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 23, TO INTIMIDATE THE POPULATION AND THE SUPPORTERS OF GENERAL AMAN SO THAT THEY WOULD NOT REACT TO HIS OUSTER AND DEATH. HOWEVER, IN DOING SO, THEY NOT ONLY RAISED THE LEVEL OF THE EMOTIONS INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT ETHIOPIAN SITUATION BUT ALSO LESSENE THE VALUE AS HOSTAGES OF THE PRISONERS THAT THEY STILL HOLD. THE CHANCES OF INCREASED VIOLENCE ARE THEREFORE ENHANCED.

PURELY IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS SEEM NOT TO HAVE BEEN A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE BETWEEN THE YOUNG OFFICERS AND GENERAL AMAN. THE DESIRE TO OUST AMAN WAS PRIMARILY DUE TO FEAR THAT HE WOULD TRY TO INCREASE HIS AUTHORITY AT THEIR EXPENSE AND/OR PERIL AND TO DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON HOW TO HANDLE THE ERITREAN PROBLEM.

HOWEVER, GENERAL AMAN WAS CONSIDERED A MODERATE AND HIS DEATH WILL NECESSARILY WEAKEN THE MODERATE ELEMENT WITHIN THE RULING MILITARY GROUP AND STRENGTHEN THE HANDS OF EXTREMISTS. THE LATTER MAY BE DISPOSED TO LOOSEN TO A GREATER OR LESSER DEGREE THE TRADITIONAL CLOSE TIES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE FIELD OF

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT PROCLAIMED IN SEPTEMBER THAT IT WOULD FOLLOW A POLICY OF "STRICT" NON-ALIGNMENT AND LET IT BE KNOWN THAT IT CONSIDERED THAT THE OLD REGIME HAD PAID ONLY LIP SERVICE TO NON-ALIGNMENT AND BEEN TOO CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH WESTERN POWERS. IT CAN BE EXPECTED THEREFORE THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL AT LEAST TRY TO APPEAR LESS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE WEST AND THE UNITED STATES. HOW FAR IT WILL GO IN TRANSLATING THIS APPEARANCE INTO REALITY REMAINS TO BE SEEN. ONE SIGNAL WILL BE IF AND HOW SERIOUSLY IT PURSUES AN ALLEGED SOVIET OFFER TO SUPPLY ARMS WHICH THE ETHIOPIAN MILITARY CONSIDER VITAL FOR THEIR DEFENSE AND WHICH WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO SUPPLY ON GRANT OR CREDIT BASIS BECAUSE OF THE AFRICAN CEILING. INGERSOLL

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